Dans cette étude, nous nous sommes servis des données du Recensement du Canada de 2001. Nous avons utilisé des tests de régression par quantile pour évaluer les inégalités des revenus d'abord aux 20 e , 50 e , 80 e et 90 e percentiles et ensuite à la moyenne de la distribution conditionnelle des salaires des membres des minorités ethniques nés au Canada. Nous avons ainsi pu évaluer les écarts aux deux extrêmes de la distribution et à la moyenne, ce qui nous a permis de vérifier la représentativité de l'inégalité moyenne par rapport à l'ensemble de la distribution.
INTRODUCTION
T he idea of a glass ceiling blocking progress for women has recently gained some attention in the economics literature. Using quantile regression techniques, researchers often conclude that there are differences in promotion opportunities for women as compared to men, and that women are effectively blocked from jobs at the upper end of the spectrum. The context of labour market outcomes for ethnic minorities is another natural domain in which to consider glass ceilings. In this paper, we use the same techniques of quantile regression to assess differences in the conditional distribution of earnings between ethnic minority and majority workers in Canada. Our data are drawn from the full 20 percent sample of the 2001 Census of Canada (Statistics Canada 2001) . This large sample allows us to examine the effect of ethnicity rather than immigration by including only Canadian-born workers and, since we are not focused on the relative attainment of women versus men, we treat men and women separately. This paper is the first to consider glass ceilings in the context of inequality across ethnic groups using quantile regression methods.
The general idea behind glass ceiling arguments is that "good" jobs, which pay more than necessary to attract labour, are in short supply, and are therefore rationed. If the rationing process is inequitable across groups, subordinate groups will have earnings distributions which look similar to that of the dominant group over ordinary jobs, but which are comparatively thin over the high-paying good jobs. However, identifying glass ceilings is not a straightforward process because it requires examining the distribution of jobs and remuneration at different points in the earnings distribution. Several papers have used quantile regression methods to explore labour market data for evidence of a glass ceiling faced by women. In this context, a glass ceiling is understood to manifest as a large disparity in the top of the distribution, with less disparity in the middle and bottom of the distribution, conditional on the productivity-related characteristics of workers (such as education). Albrecht, Bjorkland, and Vroman (2003) define a glass ceiling as the phenomenon whereby women do quite well in the labour market up to a point after which there is an effective limit on their prospects. The existence of a glass ceiling would imply that women's wages fall behind men's more at the top of the wage distribution than at the middle or bottom. (146) Albrecht et al. (2003) and Joo Kee (2005) find exactly this pattern in Sweden and Australia, respectively. Other papers find somewhat more complex patterns across the conditional distribution (see Garcia, Hernandez, and Nicolas 2001, Dolado and Llorens 2004, and  The literature on glass ceilings for women finds large disparities at the top of the conditional earnings distribution. For example, Albrecht et al. (2003) find earnings disparity on the order of 20 percent at the top decile cutoff of conditional earnings. However, most papers also find large differences in other parts of the conditional earnings distribution. De la Rica et al. (2005) find large differences in the bottom part of the conditional distribution, which they label a sticky floor, a term which is now found in many papers in the literature. They explain this sticky floor as resulting from the interaction between the labour force participation decision, firms' investments in workers, and the productivity of workers. However, because none of these researchers use data with a plausible instrument for labour force participation, they are not able to correct for its endogeneity, and cannot fully assess their story.
We investigate disparity within gender groups in the Canadian-born groups. Thus we exclude much of the plausible variation in labour force participation probabilities across groups-that between immigrants and native-born workers, and between men and women. While our data also lack an instrument for labour force participation, this measure is arguably less important when looking for glass ceilings facing native-born ethnic minority workers than when looking for glass ceilings facing women. This is because the participation rates of Canadian-born, nonAboriginal ethnic minority workers are not very different from those of Canadian-born white workers.
We find that in comparison with white women, visible minority women attain almost the same earnings across the conditional distribution. In contrast, Aboriginal women earn much less at the bottom and nearly as much at the top, which brings to mind a sticky floor pattern.
Among men, visible minorities and Aboriginals face the greatest earnings disparity at the bottom of the conditional distribution. However, if we focus on the older and more educated men, we find that visible minority men face the greatest disparity, compared to white men, at the top. This latter finding is consistent with and similar in spirit to Albrecht et al.'s (2003) conception of a glass ceiling.
Looking within the visible minority category, we see some heterogeneity across groups. First, we find that in comparison with British-origin men and women, Chinese-origin men and women face more earnings disparity at the top of the conditional earnings distribution than in other parts of the conditional distribution. Thus, Chinese-origin men and women face a glass ceiling in the sense of Albrecht et al. (2003) . Second, some groups have little or no variation in earnings disparity across the quantiles: Caribbean and Arab/West Asian men and women do not face a glass ceiling; rather, they earn less at all quantiles. Thus, like de la Rica et al. (2005) and Arulampalam et al. (2005) , depending on the minority group in question, we find disparity across the conditional distribution of earnings.
THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
The standard approach to estimating conditional mean earnings differentials has led many researchers across disciplines to assess the existence of a glass ceiling in very specific occupational or industrial niches (see Duleep and Sanders 1992 The literature in economics has also explored this area especially in the context of male-female inequality. Since Kuhn (1987) , there has been consensus in the United States that women in the upper income quantiles typically have slower promotion rates (see Lazear and Rosen 1990 for an associated model). The introduction of quantile regression methods in economics (see Koenker and Bassett 1978; Buchinsky 1994 Buchinsky , 1998a Buchinsky , 1998b led to a new generation of glass ceiling studies, wherein researchers applied quantile regression to study the return to education by gender in the United States. This growing body of literature focuses on gender wage gaps and attempts to measure earnings disparity in different parts of the conditional distribution in order to assess the glass ceiling hypothesis.
Several researchers use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to shed light on these issues. Using Spanish data, Garcia et al. (2001) , Dolado and Llorens (2004) , and de la Rica et al. (2005) find that for highly educated women, there is a glass ceiling at the upper quantiles (as was found in Sweden) but, for less educated women, they find the largest differentials at the bottom of the distribution. In contrast, Machado and Mata (2001) , using Portuguese data, find that the largest gaps across the largest earnings differentials are closer to the median of the conditional earnings distribution. Arulampalam et al. (2004) , who also use the ECHP, study the same question in 11 European countries. They find that women earn substantially less than men at the top of the earnings distribution in most of those countries. But they also find important differentials at the bottom of the distribution in about half the countries.
Researchers who find differences in the lower quantiles of the conditional distributions tend to interpret these effects as being due to some process that is different in spirit from a glass ceiling. In particular, de la Rica et al. (2005) posit that the disparity at the bottom of the conditional distribution is due to the interaction of women's participation decisions, education decisions, and firm investment decisions. For example, less educated women might have lower labour force attachment and attract lower investment from their employer.
The treatment of participation effects in the estimation of earnings disparities across men and women typically requires instruments for participation that are independent of conditional earnings. None of the above papers examining male-female disparity treat endogeneity formally because such instruments are not available. While one might argue that these effects are small in the Nordic countries where participation rates are very similar across men and women, this is a much harder case to make in southern Europe. Whereas participation rates differ greatly between men and women, they hardly vary at all between ethnic groups in the native-born population. Since our study is of native-born ethnic minorities only, our analysis of earnings disparity is in some sense more straightforward because the participation decision is neither a feature of theory, nor an important part of the econometrics.
THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION AND CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS
Most theories of discrimination against particular population groups attempt to explain (or deny the existence of) differences in the conditional mean of earnings, wages, or other labour market outcomes.
For example, Becker's (1957) classic work on discriminatory preferences in competitive labour and product markets predicted that the result of such preferences would be segregation of workers into subeconomies. Because returns to scale are assumed constant, each subeconomy is equally productive, so that wages are equal for all workers with identical productive characteristics. That is, discriminatory preferences result in segregation, and segregation results in equality of the mean of wages conditional on productive characteristics.
If the assumptions of competitive product and labour markets are relaxed, however, the "separatebut-equal" conclusions do not follow. For example, if product markets are not competitive so that some firms make excess profits which are partially shared with (possibly unionized) workers, workers in those firms will earn more money than identical workers in other firms with less excess profits. Or, if some workers receive wage premiums to induce them to provide unobservable effort, these workers will make more money than identical workers in work environments without these wage premiums. The presence of rents, quasi-rents, or efficiency wages all may result in wage dispersion among workers with identical potential productivity.
If ethnic discrimination on the part of employers, workers, or customers results in white workers ending up in the high-wage firms/jobs and non-white workers ending up in the low-wage firms/jobs, then the segregation of workers across firms/jobs by ethnicity will result in differential outcomes. That is, the mean of earnings, conditional on productive characteristics of the worker, will be different across groups. This model also has a prediction about the conditional variation of earnings: because majority workers have a higher probability of securing "good" jobs, the top end of their conditional earnings distribution is pulled upwards. Thus, the upper quantiles of the conditional earnings distribution for majority workers will be higher than the corresponding quantiles of conditional earnings for minority workers. However, lower quantiles of the conditional distributions could well be identical for majority and minority workers.
Alternatively, one might relax the perfect information assumptions implicit in Becker's model to allow for "statistical discrimination" on the part of employers, workers, or customers. In these cases, difficulties faced by (majority) employers in assessing the quality of individual minority workers will result in poorer mean outcomes for minority workers (e.g., Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973; or Coate and Loury 1993) . Under this model, good firms offer both good wages and investments (such as training) in worker productivity to majority workers, but not to minority workers on the grounds that minority workers are "inferior." These beliefs are then corroborated by the higher productivity (due to higher investments) of majority workers. Here, firm investments result in quasi-rents that may be extracted by workers to raise their wages. If there is variation in investments, then there will be resulting variation in wages for majority workers, but no corresponding variation in wages for minority workers. The result is that the conditional mean of wages and the conditional variation in wages will be lower for minority workers. Fryer (2005) notes an additional feature of such models once embedded in a dynamic framework (see also Lazear and Rosen 1990 for a similar view of male-female differentials). If some minority workers are hired into good firms, they will be the highest potential minority workers, because minorities are subjected to a higher entry bar. These workers will thus attract greater investment from the firm, and be promoted faster than typical majority workers within the firm. The result here is that some of the difference posited above in the conditional mean and conditional variation of wages will be undone. In particular, the highest performing minority workers may fare very well in comparison with high-performing majority workers. Conditional on characteristics, we would expect the top of the wage distribution to be similar for minority and majority workers.
Similar results of segregation and inequality across groups arise in social interaction models (e.g., Durlauf 1999; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996) and in other network models (e.g., CalvoArmengol 2004; Granovetter 2005) . In the former models, within-group interactions are more valuable to people than are cross-group interactions. In the latter models, most jobs are filled through referrals and acquaintanceships that may be governed by group-based networks. Both processes may result in segregation across groups. Inequality across groups would follow from such segregation in the presence of rents (e.g., Moro and Norman 2004 refer to model access to such rents via a productivity enhancing technology).
We use the term glass ceiling to describe any process by which minorities are unable to access the highest paying jobs that might be suitable, in an abstract sense, to their potential productivity. Any of the "imperfect market" assumptions above may give rise to glass ceilings of one sort or another. The important feature of our investigation is that we condition out observable characteristics of workers when we try to assess the existence and relevance of a glass ceiling effect. We use quantile regression to directly assess how minority status affects earnings at different quantiles of the conditional earnings distribution. The approach of Albrecht et al. (2003) is to assume that all productivity-related characteristics are conditioned out in the quantile regression so that glass ceilings are characterized by greater earnings disparity in the upper conditional quantiles in comparison with the lower and middle conditional quantiles.
When we come to real-world data, however, it is likely that some of the variation in potential productivity across workers is not observed, and thus will show up in the distribution of earnings conditional on observables. In an environment where some variation in potential productivity is not observed, we may expect to see differences at other parts of the distribution (conditional on observables). For example, if raw ability is not observed but does affect potential productivity, then there may exist a glass ceiling that manifests as a differential between majority and minority workers at the lower, middle, and higher quantiles of the earnings distribution conditional on observables. Thus, minority workers with high raw ability might have poor access to suitable jobs, such as law-firm partner or software designer. Similarly, publicly employed secretary or bus driver might be good jobs suitable to workers with median raw ability, because such jobs pay a lot conditional on productivity-related characteristics, and minority workers with median ability might have poor access to these jobs.
It is thus possible that glass ceilings may affect workers in all parts of the conditional distribution. However, this view has an important disadvantage in comparison with Albrecht's approach: a glass ceiling that can bind only at the top of the conditional distribution is a testable hypothesis, but a glass ceiling that can bind anywhere in the conditional distribution is not testable. Nevertheless, it provides an alternative interpretation for sticky floors to the participationdriven stories offered by de la Rica (2005) .
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our data come from a customized microdata file drawn from the master file of the 2001 Census of Canada, which initially contained information from all the long form records collected. We have records for about 20 percent of households in general, and 100 percent of households living on those Aboriginal reserves that participated in the census. However, since some reserves, particularly those in Ontario and Quebec, chose not to participate in the census, the representativeness of the Aboriginal subsample is weakened.
We define three broad ethnic categorizations of interest: Aboriginal, visible minority, and white. These categories match those used in employment equity policy in Canada. A person is classified as Aboriginal if any of their self-reported ancestry is Aboriginal, Métis, Inuit, or North American Indian. A person is classified as visible minority if they reported a visible minority-non-European and non-Aboriginal-origin in the "population group" question of the census. All others are classified as white. We also explore the four largest ethnic groups within the visible minority category: Arab/West Asian, Caribbean, Chinese, and South Asian. 1
Since our focus is on the native-born population and our interest is in ethnic minorities, the master file of the census is the only reasonable data source for this investigation. Visible minorities born in Canada and Aboriginals each make up at most 3 percent of the Canadian-born population, so estimation and inference requires very large samples. The population examined consists of all Canadian-born residents of Canada, 25 to 64 years of age, whose primary source of income is from wages and salaries. People without any schooling were dropped from the sample as were those who did not report any income.
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of earnings from wages and salaries. There are two lists of control variables used in regressions: personal and work. Regressions labeled "personal" control for age (8 categories), schooling (13 categories), marital status (5 categories), household size (continuous), official language knowledge (3 categories), area-of-residence (12 categories-10 Census Metropolitan Areas [CMAs], 1 small CMA identifier, and 1 non-CMA identifier), and group membership (3 categories-white, aboriginal, and visible minority). Regressions labeled "work" include all the preceding variables plus full-time/ part-time status (2 categories), weeks of work (11 categories), occupation (10 categories), and industry (20 categories).
Although Statistics Canada guidelines do not allow release of the unweighted counts of population groups in our analysis, our final samples contain approximately 900,000 observations each for men and women. Table 1 reports the means of the variables used in our analysis from a subsample Table 1 to at least two decimal places for all variables except the Aboriginal population. For this group, we have a much higher proportion than in the public-use sample because census long forms are administered to 100 percent of reserve residents.
As noted above, we are unable to formally correct for the endogeneity of participation because we lack an instrument correlated with participation but uncorrelated with wages or earnings. However, we note that the participation rates of Canadian-born visible minorities (a category that does not include Aboriginals) are very similar to those of Canadianborn whites. Logistic regressions of the probability of sample inclusion for workers ages 25 to 64 on the vector of personal characteristics show that visible minority men and women have insignificantly different probabilities of participation from white men and women. In contrast, Aboriginal men and women have much lower participation rates than white men and women, which suggests that results for Aboriginals may be harder to interpret. However, if the sample is restricted to people ages 40 to 64 who have some university education, the participation probabilities of Aboriginal and visible minority men and women are statistically indistinguishable from those of white men and women. Thus, we may have more faith in the results for Aboriginals for this population subgroup, discussed in Table 3 (see Appendix  Table A1 for details).
We use quantile regression to estimate the conditional p' th quantile of log earnings attributable to ethnic group membership conditional on observable characteristics (see Buchinsky 1998a for a review of these methods in an economics context). For any given set of right-hand side conditioning variables, X, and left-hand side response variable, Y, the quantile regression finds parameters to fit the model:
When p = 0.50, this corresponds to median regression, and its parameters can be found by minimizing the sum of absolute deviations of Y from the regression line Xβ 0.50 . When p corresponds to a different quantile, the spirit of the optimization is still to minimize functions of absolute deviations, but the computations are via linear programming. We use Stata to estimate all models presented in this paper. All estimation is via unweighted quantile regression (incorporation of sample weights in the optimization make little difference to the results presented). Standard errors are estimated by Stata via the bootstrap. Because quantile regression can be computationally expensive with large samples, we use 20 percent of white workers and 100 percent of visible minority and Aboriginal workers in all reported estimates. However, because the variance of estimated differentials between groups depends most strongly on the highest variance component, sampling white workers does not much increase the variance of our coefficients of interest.
The residual in quantile regression is different from that in mean (ordinary least squares) regression. In particular, the residuals e i , e i = Y i -X i βp, are not mean-zero by construction. Rather, the quantile regression coefficients satisfy the restriction that the ratio of the sum of negative residuals to the sum of positive residuals is equal to p/1-p. Thus, if p = 0.50, as it does for median regression, the ratio of positive to negative residuals is one. In the case where residuals around the conditional mean function are distributed independently of X (which implies homoskedasticity), only the intercepts in βp differ across the quantiles p. If this is not the case, then other coefficients in βp may differ, including, for example, the coefficients associated with the ethnic origin of workers. We interpret regression coefficients from the p' th quantile regression as the difference in the conditional p' th quantile of log earnings attributable to variation in observable characteristics. We use these coefficients to shed light on the glass ceiling hypothesis.
RESULTS

Conditional Means
In what sense can the presence of a large earnings differential between white and visible minority workers or between white and Aboriginal workers point to discrimination against minorities in labour markets? The first set of differentials we report control for a variety of personal characteristics including age and education, but do not control for any job characteristics, such as occupation, industry, or work hours. Thus, even if all workers in the same occupation and industry groupings get the same hourly wages regardless of their ethnicity, our empirical strategy might find earnings differentials due to the concentration of white workers in higher paying occupations and industries, or jobs with longer work hours or weeks, compared to non-white workers.
We believe that the job characteristics of workers-such as occupation, industry, and hours-are at least as susceptible to ethnic discrimination as the wages paid to workers. In fact, the case is made by Becker (1996) and others that in competitive labour markets, ethnic discrimination by employers, workers, or customers results not in wage differentials for workers in identical jobs, but rather in segregation of workers into different jobs by ethnicity. Thus, we present regression results for models that leave out all job characteristics and, for comparison, models that include job characteristics such as full-time status, weeks of work, occupation, and industry. Table 2 shows the coefficients on broad ethnicity dummies from regressions controlling for either personal characteristics or personal and work characteristics. 2 Regressions are run separately for males and females. We run both (ordinary least squares) OLS and quantile regressions. We show output for the conditional mean (OLS regression) and the 20th, 50th, 80th, and 90th percentiles (quantile regression). We interpret OLS regression coefficients as the difference in conditional mean of log earnings Table A1 . Here, we see that the patterns at the mean in 2001 are similar to those reported for 1996 in Pendakur and Pendakur (2002) , and reinforce their finding that earnings disparity facing visible minorities and Aboriginals has worsened since the 1980s. Looking at the upper left coefficient reported in Table 2 , we see that the log earnings of Aboriginal women are 0.19 lower than that of white women conditional on personal characteristics. An approximate interpretation of this is that Aboriginal women earn 19 percent less than white women with the same personal characteristics. However, if we add work characteristics, this differential shrinks to 12 percent. We take this as evidence that Aboriginal women have poor access to jobs with work characteristics associated with high earnings. This interpretation of the difference between regressions controlling for personal characteristics and those controlling for both personal and work characteristics will carry through to our discussion of quantile regressions.
Turning to visible minority women, the conditional mean of earnings for these women is about 4 percent lower than that of white women, regardless of whether or not work characteristics are in the control list. This finding is consistent with previous research showing small or nonexistent differentials between white and visible minority women in Canadian labour markets (e.g., Pendakur and Pendakur 1998, 2002) .
Among males, the patterns in the conditional means are rather different. Aboriginal males earn much less than white males, with log earnings 0.53 less than white males with similar personal characteristics. However, half of this difference in log earnings is accounted for by the work characteristics attained by Aboriginal men. Thus, access to job characteristics may be an important part of poor labour market attainment for Aboriginal men (see also George and Kuhn 1994) . Visible minority men earn less than white men, but not nearly to the extent of Aboriginal men. Controlling only for personal characteristics, we see a differential of 13 percent between visible minority and white men. The differential drops to 8 percent if we control for work characteristics.
All earnings disparity associated with broad ethnic origin discussed above is in the conditional average of log earnings. If glass ceilings are important for ethnic minorities, then the average may hide important variation in the upper and lower tails of the conditional earnings distribution.
Conditional Distributions
Aboriginal, Visible Minority and White Workers
While the mean difference in log earnings provides us with a global picture of earnings differentials given observable characteristics, it may mask differences across the conditional distribution. We therefore turn our attention to the results from the quantile regressions. For any group, the coefficients on group membership at different quantiles may be correlated with each other. Thus, inspection of the standard errors may not reveal whether or not coefficients at different quantiles are statistically significantly different from each other. In the discussion that follows, most of the results regarding differences across quantiles are statistically significant. We identify those that are not.
Looking at the results for Aboriginal women, we can see that the conditional mean does indeed mask variation across the distribution. Conditional on personal characteristics, the 20th percentile of log earnings for Aboriginal women is 0.34 points lower than that of white women, but the 90th percentile of earnings for Aboriginal women is only .06 points lower. When work characteristics are added to the regression, the magnitudes are 0.14 points at the 20th percentile and 0.05 points at the 90th percentile. Thus, observable work characteristics soak up a great deal of the differential at all points in the distribution, and especially so at the bottom of the distribution. Further, Aboriginal women at the top of the distribution do relatively better than those at the bottom. To the extent that Aboriginal women face earnings disparity, it is evident at the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution rather than at the top. This is not a story of high-performing Aboriginal women having poor access to good jobs. Indeed, at the top of the distribution, Aboriginal women earn almost as much as white women. This is more a story
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The picture for visible minority women is quite different from Aboriginal women. Visible minority women face an earnings gap of about 2 percent in comparison with white women regardless of the quantile and whether or not work characteristics are in the control list. Given that the confidence bands on the point estimates are approximately 4 percent wide, the 4 percent differential estimated in the conditional mean is not a puzzle to be explained, but rather an estimate lying roughly within the statistical variation of the quantile estimates. Thus, visible minority women earn almost as much as white women, regardless of their place in the conditional distribution.
Turning to the results for men, we see rather different patterns. Aboriginal men earn much less than white men at every quantile, but there is much variation across quantiles. Compared to white men with similar personal characteristics, the conditional mean of log earnings of Aboriginal men is 0.53 points lower. At the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution this difference is 0.85 log-earnings points, at the median it is 0.44 log-earnings points, and at the top it is "only" 0.21 log-earnings points. Thus, as with Aboriginal women, relative earnings outcomes are much worse at the bottom of the conditional distribution than at the top. However, unlike Aboriginal women, at no point in the conditional distribution are the earnings of Aboriginal men close to those of white men at the same quantile.
Much of the difference in log earnings between Aboriginal and white men is soaked up by work characteristics. At the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution, the difference in log earnings shrinks by more than half, and at the top of the distribution, it shrinks by almost half. Work characteristics soak up the largest proportion of the log-earnings difference at the bottom of the distribution. This suggests that, as with Aboriginal women, relative access to good job characteristics may be very poor for Aboriginal men at the bottom of the distribution.
The patterns for visible minority men are similar to those observed for Aboriginal men, but the magnitudes are nowhere near as large. Controlling only for personal characteristics, we see a conditional mean differential of 13 percent. At the 20th percentile of the conditional earnings distribution, visible minority men earn 15 percent less than white men, but at the 90th percentile of the distribution, they earn only 10 percent less. Thus, assessing only the conditional mean differential hides some variation across the quantiles.
If we control for work characteristics, the variation in earnings differentials across the quantiles essentially disappears. Visible minority men earn about 6 percent less than white men at all the reported quantiles. However, given that quantile regressions that do not control for work characteristics show larger differentials at the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution, the implication is that work characteristics soak up more of the earnings differentials at the bottom of the distribution than at the top. Thus, as we observe for Aboriginal men and women, visible minority men may have relatively poor access to good job characteristics at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Although for visible minority men the largest gap is seen at the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution, weak evidence of a glass ceiling is seen at the top. In particular, the earnings differentials at the median and 80th percentile are 8 percent but at the 90th it is 10 percent (this difference across the quantiles is not statistically significant). Further, a substantial part of this differential is accounted for by work characteristics.
These findings are not suggestive of a glass ceiling in the sense of Albrecht et al. (2003) . In their view, a glass ceiling evokes the image of a highperforming minority worker hitting a barrier that limits her earnings or achievement. Instead, we observe low-performing minority workers attaining much lower earnings than their low-performing white counterparts. High-peforming minority workers seem to be less affected (though not unaffected).
Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, this conceptualization of the glass ceiling might be wrong. To the extent that glass ceilings are the manifestation of unequal access to rents, there is no reason a priori to assume that rents are available only at the top of the earnings distribution. Second, we might imagine that glass ceilings matter only to established workers, because it takes time to hit such ceilings, or that they might matter only to educated workers, because we believe a priori that glass ceilings are about opportunities for highly skilled workers.
To assess this second possibility, we ran the same regressions on the subset of workers ages 40 to 64 who have some university education. Table 3 presents these results. As noted above, although Aboriginal men and women have lower labour force participation rates than white men and women in the population as a whole, in this older and moreeducated population subsample, the participation rates are about the same for Aboriginals, whites, and visible minorities (see Appendix Table A2 ).
Looking first at Aboriginal women, we see that the disparity in the conditional mean of log earnings is lower than was seen in Table 1 ( -.16 vs. -.19) . Similarly, at the 80th and 90th percentiles, the differentials are actually larger in this subsample than when measured for the whole population. For older, better-educated Aboriginal women, the very large differentials at the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution observed at the level of the whole population do not seem as important. In regressions controlling only for personal characteristics, no pairwise comparison across quantiles is statistically significant. In contrast, when work characteristics are included, a pronounced sticky floor is evident, with a differential of 23 percent at the 20th percentile and 11 percent at the upper decile cutoff.
The picture is quite different for visible minority women. While the results from Table 1 suggest that visible minority women as a whole face some small differentials when compared to white women, all of these differences disappear when restricting analysis to the older, educated population. In regressions that control either for personal characteristics or for both personal and work characteristics, there are no significant differences between the earnings of visible minority and white women at the mean, or at any quantile.
Turning to older and better-educated Aboriginal men, we can see that at the top of the distribution, things look similar to the results from Table 2 . However, at the bottom of the distribution the amount of disparity is much smaller in the older, educated subsample. For example, at the 20th percentile, the log earnings of Aboriginal men are 0.57 lower controlling for personal characteristics and 0.35 lower controlling for both personal and work characteristics. In contrast, at the level of the whole population, these numbers are 0.85 and 0.31 respectively. Thus, the older, educated population of Aboriginal men faces less earnings disparity compared to the Aboriginal population as a whole only in the lower half of the conditional earnings distribution. This finding suggests that at the bottom end, well-educated Aboriginal men are more able to overcome the barriers faced by their less-educated and younger counterparts. However, the pattern of greater earnings disparity at the bottom of the conditional distribution in comparison with the top of the conditional distribution is still evident.
In the analysis using the whole population, we saw weak evidence of a glass ceiling for visible minority men. However, using the better-educated and older subpopulation, it appears that well-educated visible minority men do face a glass ceiling. In particular, when we control only for personal characteristics, the earnings differential increases from the bottom to the top of the distribution. At the median, the differential is 7 percent, but at the 90th percentile it is 12 percent (this difference is only marginally statistically significant: p = .08). About half of the differential is soaked up by work characteristics regardless of where one looks in the distribution.
If we focus specifically on the population that might be presupposed to face a glass ceiling and define a glass ceiling as large differentials at the upper end, then among men, such a glass ceiling is strongly evident for visible minorities, but not for Aboriginals. Among women, it is not evident for either visible minorities or Aboriginals. However, for both Aboriginal men and women, we see a different kind of pattern-the differentials are largest at the bottom of the conditional distributions and smallest at the top of the conditional distributions. This pattern suggests a sticky floor for Aboriginals rather than a glass ceiling.
Visible Minority Ethnic Groups
The visible minority category is an amalgam of a large number of distinct non-European ethnic groups. Our data allow us to identify many of the constituent groups, and we have sufficient counts to discuss four groups in particular: Arab/West Asian, Caribbean, Chinese (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), and South Asian (which encompasses the Indian subcontinent). Table 4 shows results from regressions for selected detailed ethnic groups. These results are analogous to those reported in Table 2 , but instead of an ethnic breakdown of three broad categorizations (white, visible minority, and Aboriginal), we dummy out 37 distinct ethnic categories (22 white, 9 visible minority, and 6 Aboriginal). 3 In this section we focus on visible minority ethnic groups and compare their outcomes to British-origin workers (the left-out category). Table 4 shows that the small and non-existent differentials reported in Table 2 for visible minority women hide important heterogeneity across groups. In particular, Chinese women earn more than British-origin women, Arab and West Asian women earn about the same as British-origin women, and Caribbean and South Asian women earn less than British-origin women.
Inspection of
Turning to the quantiles, for Chinese women it is evident that most of the action for their earnings premium is at the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution. Chinese women at the 20th percentile earn 15 percent more than British women with similar personal characteristics. But this premium falls to 4 percent if work characteristics are included. Thus, at the bottom of the distribution, Chinese women appear to earn more money and to have higher-paying work characteristics than British-origin women. At other points in the distribution, these features are much less prominent. For example, Chinese women earn about 4 percent more than British-origin women at the top of the distribution, and if work characteristics are controlled for, the premium is insignificantly different from zero.
Caribbean women face a very different pattern. Their earnings are lower than British-origin women across the distribution, and in regressions that control only for personal characteristics, the disparity is essentially the same at all quantiles. When we add work characteristics the differential falls by half at the 20th percentile and by about one-fifth at the 90th percentile. Because work characteristics soak up less variation at the top of the distribution, regressions that control for these characteristics suggest a glass ceiling with an earnings gap of 6 percent at the bottom growing to a gap of 9 percent at the top (this difference is marginally significant).
South Asian women face yet another pattern of earnings differences. For them, earnings disparity is much larger at the bottom of the distribution. Controlling only for personal characterstics, South Asian women earn 11 percent less than Britishorigin women at the 20th percentile. About one-third of this gap is accounted for by work characteristics. In contrast, at the median and above, they earn about the same as British-origin women whether work characteristics are included or not.
It appears, therefore, that patterns of differentials are very heterogeneous across groups. Chinese women enjoy an earnings premium at the bottom, but South Asian and Caribbean women face a penalty. Caribbean women face earnings gaps from the median to the top of the distribution, but other groups do not. South Asian women face an earnings disparity that is largest at the bottom of the conditional distribution. Thus, the results in Table 2 for the visible minority group taken as a whole are somewhat misleading because the small or nonexistent differentials are in fact "averages" of positive and negative effects for different subgroups of the visible minority aggregate.
There are some similarities in the inter-ethnic group patterns observed for men and women. Looking at the conditional means for men, we can see that the spirit of the differentials is roughly similar to that observed for women. In particular, Chinese and Arab/West Asian men earn about the same as British-origin men, but Caribbean and South Asian men earn much less (16 percent less when only personal characteristics are included, and about 10 percent less when work characteristics are added). The patterns across the quantiles for men are also very similar in spirit to those seen for women.
South Asian men face the largest earnings disparity at the bottom of the distribution, whereas Chinese men perform relatively better at the bottom. Chinese men earn about the same as British-origin men up to the median. But at the 90th percentile, they earn 5 percent less. This is consistent with a glass ceiling in the sense of Albrecht et al. (2003) , wherein all the action is at the top of the conditional distribution.
South Asian men earn 25 percent less at the 20th percentile, the lion's share of which is accounted for by work characteristics. At the bottom of the distribution, South Asian men do not attain good work characteristics. However, at other parts of the distribution, the differential is much smaller-on the order of 10 percent-and a much smaller amount of the differential is explained by work characteristics. So, at the middle and top of the conditional distribution, South Asian men face less earnings disparity than they do at the bottom of the conditional distribution.
In contrast, there is little variation across the quantiles for Caribbean-origin and Arab/West Asian men. In particular, Caribbean-origin men earn much less than British-origin men across the distribution. Arab/West Asian-origin men earn the same as, or slightly more than, British-origin men across the distribution. Whereas for Chinese and South Asian men the differentials in conditional means mask potentially important variation across the conditional distributions, for Caribbean-origin and Arab/ West Asian men this is not the case.
For both men and women, the visible minority aggregate masks important variation across its constituent ethnic groups. For women, the absence of an earnings differential for visible minorities as a whole masks large negative differentials for Caribbean and South Asian women and positive differentials for Chinese women. For men, this same pattern is evident, but the relative earnings of all the visible minority groups are lower. CONCLUSIONS Albrecht et al. (2003) define a glass ceiling in the context of gender earnings disparity as a situation where women earn less than men at the top of the conditional distribution, but not in other parts of the conditional distribution. We consider glass ceilings in the context of the earnings of ethnic minorities, using a database of Canadian-born ethnic minority and majority workers drawn from the 20 percent sample of the 2001 Census of Canada. We exclusively focus on within-gender comparisons. We find evidence of a glass ceiling in the spirit of Albrecht et al. (2003) for older and more-educated visible minority men in comparison with similar white men. However, we do not see such a pattern for Aboriginal men or women, or for visible minority women in comparison with white men or women. Looking inside the visible minority category, we find evidence of a glass ceiling for Chinese-origin men in comparison with British-origin men, and rough evidence of a similar pattern for Chinese-origin women in comparison with British-origin women.
We see two other patterns in the data, both of which are observed in the context of gender earnings in Europe (Arulampalam et al. 2004; de la Rica et al. 2005) . First, we observe a pattern of large differentials at the bottom of the conditional distribution but smaller differentials at the middle and at the top for several groups. In particular, Aboriginal men face extreme earnings disparity at the bottom of the conditional distribution and smaller but still substantial disparity at the top. For Aboriginal and South Asian women there is considerable earnings disparity at the bottom, but very little at the top. Second, some groups-especially Caribbean and Arab/West Asian men and women-have little or no statistically measurable variation across the quantiles. For these groups, the quantile approach does not reveal anything beyond what is seen in the traditional conditional mean approach.
Our investigation using quantile regression methods reveals features of earnings disparity that are not seen with traditional conditional mean methods. In particular, for many population subgroups, earnings disparity is different at the top of the conditional distribution than at the bottom. For visible minority men taken as a whole, there is evidence of a glass ceiling that binds their earnings at the top of the conditional distribution. Within the visible minority aggregate, there is strong evidence that such a glass ceiling binds Chinese-origin workers. However, South Asian-origin men seem to face the opposite pattern, which has been called a sticky floor, with the greatest earnings disparity at the bottom of the conditional distribution. Both Aboriginal men and women also face a sticky floor in comparison with white workers.
From the point of view of antidiscrimination policy, such as employment equity in the Canadian federal government, these findings are important. The main constraint facing Chinese men seems to be access to the very best jobs. Employment equity policy, which focuses on job access, is currently constructed to give minority groups (somewhat) preferential access to all jobs. However, for those groups facing a glass ceiling, access to high-paying and/or managerial jobs is more important, and the policy could conceivably be focused on relaxing this constraint. In contrast, we find that the key constraints facing Aboriginal workers are at the bottom of the conditional distribution. Since federal government workers are generally more educated and better paid than the population as a whole, equity policy that works entirely through federal employment may be a very weak tool for alleviating the earnings disparity faced by Aboriginals. Notes: Data were selected for all Canadian-born residents of Canada, 25-64 years of age. People without any schooling were dropped from the sample as were those without any earnings. Note that coefficients are related to marginal effects via multiplication by p(1-p) where p is the probability of participation.
NOTES
Source: 2001 Census of Canada, Individuals File (Public Use Microdata Files).
